ESSAY

RESCUING IMPOSSIBILITY DOCTRINE:
A POSTMODERN FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW*
MARY JOE FRUGt

In this Essay, I seek to enrich contract doctrine by using feminist
strategies as a means of contesting and restructuring conventional
and stalemated understandings. At the same time, I hope to
contribute to feminist theory by exposing, on the somewhat unlikely
terrain of the common law, how conventional analytical devices are
deeply implicated in the construction of our current gender system.
In the pursuit of these objectives, I am going to be particularly
concerned with three "texts." The "texts" are law review articles
written by male legal scholars for a law readership.
I originally chose the doctrinal problem I am going to discuss
for a research project as a result of political happenstance. In 1988,
a contracts scholar, who was then serving as chair of the Contracts
Section of the Association of American Law Schools, declined a
proposal for a joint Association program with feminists. In a
publicly circulated letter, the chair explained his decision by
elaborating his view that the topic of the relationship between
feminist theory and contract law was not "developed... to a point
where it is ready for such a sponsorship," that it does not yet have
"a respectable basis."1 "In contrast," he wrote, the topic upon
which the Contracts Section would focus its program, "excuse of
* © Copyright 1992, Gerald E. Frug.
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performance, adjustment of contract and limitation of remedy on
account of unexpected events," "has been thoroughly developed in
the literature." 2 Feminist theory, he concluded, was unlikely (ever)
to contribute significantly to contract law because "the male bias of
our society ... has not had important consequences for contract
3
law."
Since debates regarding different ways of handling doctrinal
problems are a staple component of legal scholarship, I immediately
decided to challenge his prediction by writing, as a feminist, about
whatever doctrinal issue his group was discussing at the time. In a
coincidence that may arouse your interest as it did mine, the
contract doctrine I blindly assigned myself uncannily resonates with
a postmodern stance toward the female subject. "It is impossible to
dissociate the questions of art, style and truth from the question of
the woman," 4 Derrida writes in Spurs.
Nevertheless the question "what is woman?" is itself suspended by
the simple formulation of their common problematic. One can no
longer seek her, no more than one could search for woman's
femininity or female sexuality. And she is certainly not to be
found in any of the familiar modes of concept or knowledge. Yet
[he concludes] it is impossible to resist looking for her.5
"[I]mpossible to dissociate . .." and "impossible to resist looking
.... " The contract doctrine which is the subject of the "texts" I will
discuss is the doctrine of impossibility.
INTRODUCTION

The "texts" involving impossibility doctrine that I am going to
discuss are an essay by Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield in
the 1977 Journal of Legal Studies;6 Robert Hillman's 1983 Cornell
Law Review essay; 7 and a second Hillman piece which is in the 1987
Duke Law Journal.8 These articles are important because they
2 Id. at 2.

3 Id.
4JACQUES DERRIDA, SpuRs: NIETZSCHE'S STYLES 71 (Barbara Harlow trans., 1978)
(em phasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
6 Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines
in ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
7 Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of ContractualRelations, 68
CORNELL
L. 1Ev. 617 (1983).
8
Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long.Term Contracts: An Analysis Under
Modern ContractLaw, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1.
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capture the conflict within the academic dispute about the application of impossibility doctrine. I am going to argue that the rhetoric
and analytical characteristics of the Posner/Rosenfield position on
impossibility doctrine are helpfully understood as stereotypically
masculine, both in their strengihs and in their weaknesses. In
contrast, the Hillman article is helpfully understood as offering a
feminine alternative version of the doctrine, with the strengths and
weaknesses associated with that stereotypical position.
As Fran Olsen has written in her article, "The Sex of Law," it is
often the case when opposing discourses develop, in law but also
elsewhere, that the relationship between the dichotomies in the
opposing discourses is likely to mirror cultural stereotypes of
women and men.' Identifying the gendered character of the
discourses can therefore be a feminist strategy for challenging the
extensive and complicated network of social and cultural practices
which legitimate the subordination of women. The assumption
underlying this strategy is that language is a mechanism of power,
that there is always more at stake in the relationship of gender and
language than "just" a question of literary style-indeed, that style
itself can constitute a powerful socializing apparatus.
There are at least three forms which such a feminist strategy can
take. One form, which I will not pursue in this Essay, focuses on
the specific gender of individuals noted in a text, analyzing the ways
in which male and female characters and even their pronouns are
deployed. This practice is illustrated by some of my argument in
reviewing Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson's fourth edition, 10 such
as the assertion that the disproportionate number of male parties in
the cases reproduced in that text is likely to foster sexist attitudes
in readers regarding the position of women or womanly persons in
the law.
A second form of feminist discourse practice is to examine the
relationship between the dichotomies in a particular discourse and
cultural stereotypes of women and men. Such dichotomies are
often unconsciously but sometimes consciously molded by their
authors to resonate with stereotypical sex differences. in this Essay
9
See Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law 1-2 (Dec. 14,1988) (unpublished manuscript,
on file
10 with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review).
See Mary Joe Frug, Re.Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).

1032

UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 140:1029

I am going to argue that the academic literature on impossibility
doctrine can be arranged along such a masculine/feminine axisindeed, that it is hard to avoid the sense that this work involves
unconscious self-stereotyping around gender categories.
A third form of feminist discourse analysis is to show the way
meaning can acquire gendered overtones through the use of
rhetoric which a reader consciously or unconsciously registers as
sexual double entendre. Thus, I am going to argue that the Posner/
Rosenfield and the Hillman articles contain rhetoric which is
repeatedly suggestive of stereotypical male and female "sex talk."
Before turning to a discussion of the articles themselves, let me
state in a generalized way some of the reasons why I believe that
analyzing the gender of legal discourse is useful. First, to the extent
that there is a cultural compulsion to maintain the gendered
integrity of texts, pursuing the gendered character of a particular
text is likely to facilitate a reader's understanding of that text. For
example, having identified the Posner/Rosenfield piece as stereotypically masculine, my appreciation of the authors' technical
argument about impossibility doctrine is likely to be enhanced by
using my understanding of masculinity as a stereotyped role,
persona, or mask as a guide to its meaning.
Second, because of the relational character of gendered
identities, a reader's understanding of opposing discourses can be
furthered by using a gendered trait within one discourse to predict,
to understand, or to critique the other. In addition, the hierarchical
dimension of gender relations can illuminate the positioning of
opposing discourses. In legal debates about doctrinal problems it
is almost always the case that one line of thought is understood as
the standard or dominant approach, and the second line of thought
is treated as exceptional or subordinate to the first. Identifying the
gender mask an author assumes not only helps predict which
hierarchical position a text will occupy but may also help one
understand its entrenchment in that position.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the gendered character
of discourse can expose weaknesses in legal argument. The cultural
compulsion to maintain the gendered identity of one's text involves
one-inevitably, perhaps-in the vices of one's virtues. Finding
ruptures in a text where its gendered character falters is likely to
indicate a problem in the line of thought the text is developing.
One last point of introduction might also be useful-a brief
definition of two phrases I have already used in this Essay, feminist
theory and impossibility doctrine. I am usually reluctant to define
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feminist theory separately from the broader, more politically
charged category of "feminism" on the grounds that this division
can lead to a falsely abstracted and misleading unification of
feminist projects. Nevertheless, it seems fair to acknowledge that,
like other political movements, feminism has a discourse of
explanation which can reasonably be called "theory." I am not sure
that much feminism will be excluded by my definition of theory as
work which seeks to accountfor the condition of women as well as to
illustrate it or oppose it, but this definition has the important virtue
of being supple enough to include multiple and even inconsistent
categories of explanation.
Although categories within feminist theory are imprecise and
overlap, the treatment of impossibility doctrine I will offer here is
primarily informed by postmodern feminism, the particular blend
of psychoanalysis, linguistics, and philosophy which is concerned
with sexual difference and which is associated with the writing of
French feminists such as Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva and
11
American feminists such as Barbara Johnson and Jane Gallop.
In acknowledging the influence of postmodern feminist scholarship,
I do not mean to imply that I am conforming to an orthodox
methodology or line. I doubt that I am. What does link this paper
programmatically with postmodern feminism is a shared intention
to disrupt cultural dichotomies-especially, and controversially, the
dichotomy of male/female.
Other feminist theories, such as socialist feminism, cultural
feminism, lesbian feminism, and the feminism of women of color
might also inform and affect a doctrinal analysis of impossibility,
although they also might not. For the purposes of this Essay I have

quite deliberately overlooked the diversity of feminist theory and
the conflict within feminist theories, concentrating instead on the
assistance which postmodern feminism has been able to offer my
undertaking.
11 See, e.g., JANE GALLOP, THE DAUGHTER'S SEDUCTION: FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS (1982) [hereinafter GALLOP, SEDUCTION];JANE GALLOP, THINKING THROUGH
THE BODY (1988) [hereinafter GALLOP, THINKING]; LUCE IRIGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE
OTHER WOMAN (Gillian C. Gill trans., 1985); LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT
ONE (Catherine Porter trans., 1985) [hereinafter IRIGARAY, THIS SEX]; BARBARA
JOHNSON, THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE (1980); BARBARA JOHNSON, A WORLD OF
DIFFERENCE (1987) [hereinafter JOHNSON, A WORLD]; JULIA KRISTEVA, DESIRE IN
LANGUAGE: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO LITERATURE AND ART (Thomas Gora et al.

trans., 1980); JULIA KRISTEVA, THE KRISTEVA READER (Toril Moi ed., 1986)
[hereinafter KRISTEVA, READER].
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The term impossibility doctrine has generally been used to refer
to a particular subcategory of law relating to cases in which
contractual parties seek to escape their contractual responsibilities
on account of "extraordinary," "unanticipated," or "disruptive"
circumstances. Other subcategories are the doctrines of mistake,
frustration of purpose, commercial impracticability, and failure of
presupposed conditions. Like others currently writing about these
subcategories, I think the commonalities among the doctrines are
more usefully examined than the distinctions. 12 Although elsewhere these doctrines have been referred to collectively as excuse,
discharge, or cessation law, I am going to use the term impossibility
as a unifying name. I have chosen this name to indicate a deliberate
break with the gendered character of current scholarship. In order
for feminist theory to rescue (re-skew) excuse doctrine from (within)
the respectable debate in which it is currently stuck, I intend to
argue, descending only for the moment into postmodern jargon,
that excuse doctrine is "impossible," that impossibility doctrine is
13
the diff6rance of contract law.
II. THE POSNER/ROSENFIELD AND HILLMAN ARTICLES

A. The Gendered Characterof Impossibility Scholarship
I begin with the gendered character of the position Posner and
Rosenfield take on impossibility doctrine. Summarily dismissing
prior attempts to predict when performance will be excused-"The
foreseeability test.., is non-operational.. ."1 4 -the authors articulate a new standard for deciding when contract performance should
be excused.
"[D]ischarge should be allowed," they propose,
whenever "the promisee is the superior risk bearer."1 5 This
standard is applied through a three step analysis, in which a
12 See e.g., FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRAcTS: CASES & MATERIALS 861-976
(1986) (discussing the "jurisprudential misfortune" of courts treating mistakes
different from impossibilities or frustrations); Hillman, supra note 7, at 617-18
(arguing that the various doctrines for cessation are treated similarly by the courts);
Hillman, supra note 8, at 31 (arguing that court intervention should be standardized
for certain "impracticable" circumstances); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 6, at 8586 (asserting that the treatment of contract-discharging doctrines alike for purposes
of analysis is most useful).
Is See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, Diffirance, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 1-27
(Alan Bass trans., 1982).
14 Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 6, at 100.
15 Id. at 90.
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decision maker determines a) which party can estimate the probability of loss; b) which party can estimate the magnitude of the loss;
16
and c) which party is better situated to insure against the loss.
Posner and Rosenfield confidently claim that the "superior risk
bearer" standard can explain "the typical outcomes in the major
classes of cases." 17 To the extent that decided cases are inconsistent with the standard, the authors are unperturbed. "It is not our
18
purpose to explain or even identify every inconsistent outcome."
To the extent that the application of the test points in opposite
directions, the authors' confidence in their standard is undiminished; they assert that "empirical studies" will resolve such con19
flicts.
Like a phallus, this conceptual proposal is singular, daunting,
rigid, and cocksure. The purpose of the "superior risk bearer"
standard, as they see it, is to permit courts to decide impossibility
cases as if the singular legitimate decisional objective is to facilitate
efficient contract planning. 20 (In other words, the only purpose
of the legal impossibility standard is to guide parties in future cases
so that they can minimize drafting time and effort; the standard is
unconcerned with parties already in contractual relationships who
desire to know what their responsibilities might be should performance begin to seem "impossible.") In pursuit of future contract
planning, Posner and Rosenfield treat all contracts as if they fit a
particular, abstract model of contractual relations, in which the
relationship between the parties is highly delineated and quite
historically discrete. 2 1 Finally, the authors rely on and defend a
sharply and cleanly dichotomized system of contractual remedies,
according to which contractual obligations must either be performed in full or discharged.2 2 Because the proposal is focused on
a single goal, because it is confidently predicated on an abstract
model of contractual relations, and because of its clearly decisive,
on or off remedial implications, the characteristics of the Posner/
16 See id. at 90-92.
17 Id. at 100.
18 Id.

19 See id. at 102, 108.
20 See id. at 90.
21 See, e.g., id. at 98 (using the economically-based discharge doctrine "to supply
those contract terms that the parties would have adopted if they had negotiated
expressly over them").
22 See, e.g., id. at 110 (comparing the breach/discharge dichotomy to the strict/no
liability choice).
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Rosenfield impossibility standard correspond to stereotypical male
virtues.
Hillman's article presents a sharply contrasting approach to
impossibility doctrine along all the dimensions I have just mentioned. His approach actually rejects all three characteristics of the
"risk bearer" standard. Thus, Hillman proposes that courts apply
impossibility doctrine to serve a number of goals besides the
facilitation of future contract planning. These goals, which Hillman
calls "fairness norms," include favoring the party with greater
equities, rewarding efforts to avoid harm to the other party,
rewarding reasonable conduct, and achieving reciprocity in a
deal.2 3 Hillman explicitly grounds his proposal, following Ian
Macneil, 24 in a pluralistic, context-sensitive model of contract
relations, emphasizing that in the real world many contracts are
based on long-term relationships in which the parties rely on good
faith, forbearance, and sharing, rather than insisting on a literal
interpretation of their contract texts. Finally, Hillman, like Richard
Speidel,25 seeks to modify the rigid dichotomy of performance or
discharge, arguing for an examination of the actual harm being
caused to a party and urging that a duty of adjustment should be
judicially inferred in some situations.2 6 Because Hillman's impossibility proposal is characterized by a concern for multiple objectives, by an appreciation of contextualized relationships, and by a
desire to achieve flexibility and sharing in the administration of
contract remedies, his proposal neatly fits the popular interpretation
of Carol Gilligan's depiction of the virtuous feminine attitudes
toward justice.

27

2'
24 See Hillman, supra note 7, at 629-39.
See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS 44-47 (1980).
25

See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term
Supply Contracts,76 NW. U. L. REV. 369, 370 (1981) (discussing the appropriateness
of court-imposed adjustments of contract terms); Richard E. Speidel, Excusable
Nonperformance in Sales Contexts: Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C. L.
REV. 241, 270-71 (1980) (arguing that there is a role for court adjustment in
impracticable
circumstances).
26
See generallyHillman, supranote 8, at 19-33 (describing the circumstances under
which
court adjustment may be appropriate).
27
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND

WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 18, 30, 62-63 (1982). For an analysis of Gilligan's influence
in legal scholarship, see Mary Joe Frug, ProgressiveFeministLegal Scholarship: Can We
Claim 'A Different Voice"?, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 1992).
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The gendered opposition between the Posner/Rosenfield article
and Hillman's articles accentuates Hillman's sometimes explicit but
often implicit criticism of the masculine impossibility position.
Simply by concretizing and disaggregating an abstract model of
contractual relations and by pointing out the merit of expanding
conventional remedial options, Hillman's articles offer a critique of
the male model which is both powerful and also reminiscent of
typical feminine criticisms of masculinity. That is, Hillman's
equitable approach suggests the element of arbitrarinessin imposing
the "superior risk bearer" standard in situations where it might have
little to do with what the parties actually intended. The gendered
opposition between the Posner/Rosenfield article and the Hillman
articles also suggests the incomplete and partial character of each
position.
I turn now to the sexual double entendre of the rhetoric in
these articles. The tone of the Posner/Rosenfield article strikes me
as markedly masculine. The article bristles with such cockiness that
some of the authors' relatively commonplace law review language
takes on the overtones of locker-room swagger as I read it. For
example, the authors observe that conventional legal categories in
this area of law are "empty,"28 and they comment that even the
most promising branch of scholastic commentary is "sterile."29 In
their promise to do something about this situation, they boast that
30
they will "give content" to an economic analysis of the doctrine.
These observations undoubtedly contribute to the suggestive
significance I find in the authors' disregard of the phrase "impossibility doctrine" throughout the body of their article. Despite having
used the phrase in their title and in subtitles, elsewhere they almost
exclusively describe their subject in terms of "discharge," "discharge
cases," and "discharge law." In my judgment, the depth of the
authors' substantive bias in favor of contract performance and
against discharge is emphasized by the contrast between the word
"performance" and its association with completed, conventional
heterosexual intercourse, and the association between the word
"discharge" and its overtones of Coitus interruptus, nocturnal
emissions, and masturbation. The rhetorical impression of maleness
28 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 6, at 86 ("Since the typology is empty...

[it] has led legal scholars to despair of generalizing fruitfully about the discharge
problem.").
29 See id. at 87-88 ("[T]hus far the insight has been a sterile one.").
30 See id. at 88.
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this article conveys is partly derived from the sense that these two
contrasting categories of sexual activities define the authors' limited,
stereotypically masculine erotic universe.
In contrast to the Posner/Rosenfield article, the structure, tone,
and language of the Hillman articles have feminine overtones.
Hillman's tone is unintimidating, accommodating, and unassuming,
not cocksure. His position on impossibility is set forth in two
articles and developed throughfour fairness norms; it has multiple
parts. In contrast to the daunting Posnerian tone, Hillman modestly
describes his impossibility standard as "supplement[al]" to the
principle of "freedom of contract";3 1 he deferentially places his
standard regarding excuse of performance after a discussion of the
express and implied desires of contract parties. 32 Read in comparison with the Posnerian rhetoric, Hillman's tropes, the figurative
language he uses, evoke a stereotypically female description of
sexual relations. Hillman's unifyling name for impossibility doctrine
is "cessation" rather than "discharge," and rather than promising to
"give content" to an analysis or erect a "framework" he uses the
language of display: he promises to "present," to "demonstrate" his
thesis. 33 His frequently stated and principal concern is the
application of impossibility law where parties have left "gaps" in
4
their contracts.
B. Disruptingthe Gendered Opposition of Impossibility
Scholarship
Like other postmodern theorists, postmodern feminists use
deconstructive analytical strategies to expose contradictory and
repressed elements embedded within and supporting the deceptively
coherent message on the surface of a text. The strategy I will use
here-a strategy inspired by Jane Gallop's most recent book,
Thinking Through the Body3 5 -consists of identifying what I call a
critical rupture in a passage; a rupture which, in BarbaraJohnson's
words, "encounters and propagates the surprise of otherness" or
31 See Hillman, supra note 7, at 620.
32 See id. at 620-29 (discussing express and implied desires of contracting parties);

id. at 629-42 (describing a model of "fairness in contract cessation").

33 See id. at 620 ("In the conclusion, I present some brief observations based on
the survey in Part II."); id. at 617 ("My first goal is to demonstrate that the courts
generally have taken a common approach to the issue of cessation.").
I See id. at 627 (discussing, under the subheading "Gaps," failures of certain
contracts to "consider and plan for contingencies that will arise").
35 See GALLOP, THINKING, supra note 11.
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difference.8 6 In each of the texts I examine, the critical rupture is
a point where analytical cogency is sacrificed to the gendered
integrity of the authors' positions.
A critical rupture in the Posner/Rosenfield article occurs at the
moment two-thirds of the way into the article when the authors
briefly discuss "doubtful cases." 7 "Doubtful cases" are defined as
those in which the "superior risk bearer" test "will fail to yield a
definite answer."38 In singling out "doubtful cases" for separate
treatment Posner and Rosenfield seem about to face a critique of
their own proposal. They seem about to stray from the firm and
confident masculinity that has characterized their argument.
Doctrinally the authors could have chosen one of at least three
solutions for cases which the risk bearer standard does not explain.
They could have recommended discharge; they could have recommended, as they did, that parties be required to perform; or they
could have recommended that "doubtful cases" be subject to an
equitable approach, such as the one Hillman proposed. That is,
they could have chosen a solution that would have broken the
absolutism of the "superior risk bearer" standard by taking into
account the situation of the parties after the contract had been
formed.
The authors reject a Hillman-like solution. Their solution is
decisive but largely unexplained. "Pending definitive empirical
study," they say that the appropriate resolution of doubtful cases is
to reject the application of impossibility doctrine and reaffirm the
principle of strict liability in contract.8 9
By rejecting an equitable approach, with its attendant uncertainty, Posner and Rosenfield refuse an open solution that would have
been inconsistent with the closure they seek. An equitable approach, as Hillman himself points out, is subject to criticism because
it pursues fairness at the cost of certainty. 40 By rejecting discharge
and requiring parties to perform, Posner and Rosenfield choose an
authoritarian rather than a permissive solution for "doubtful cases."
Confronting a threat to the logic of their argument (confronting,
one might also say, difference, or woman), their response exhibits
the weaknesses stereotypically associated with masculinity: they are
3

6JoHNSON, A WoRLD, supra note 11, at 15.
38 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 6, at 110-11.
Id. at 110.
37

39 See id.

40 See Hillman, supra note 7, at 659.
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arbitrary, rigid, and authoritarian. They are unable to claim what
Keats called "Negative Capability"-the capacity "of being in
uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after
41
fact & reason."
Although there is much to admire in Hillman's impossibility
proposal, analyzing the feminization of his work similarly helps
reveal the problems that adhere in his approach. A critical rupture
in Hillman's proposal occurs in a short section where he concludes
his presentation of the "fairness norms." Although he has earlier
claimed that the "fairness norms" can "explain" impossibility
decisions 42 and has minimized the Posnerian standard as "only of
limited help," 43 here he acknowledges the significance of the
Posnerian proposal, admitting that "[c]ourts sometimes justify
cessation decisions ... on the economic and social policies of
avoiding economic waste and promoting the economy through
contract formation." 44
Hillman seems about to analyze the
relationship between his standard and the "superior risk bearer"
principle; he seems about to confront a masculine challenge to the
feminine virtues of his proposal.
This moment in Hillman's piece, the point when a tough
question is raised in the text, parallels the Posner/Rosenfield
examination of "doubtful cases." But unlike their decisive, if
arbitrary, resolution, Hillman is contradictory and conciliatory.
Stating at first that he must avoid the question, because the
relationship between the two standards is "complex" and "beyond
the scope of this paper," 45 he immediately reverses this decision,
allowing himself "some brief observations."46
Among these
observations is the disingenuous claim that the two standards
"generally dictate the same result" since the two standards
"correspond." 47
Hillman introduces this latter claim with a
conventional feminine disclaimer.
"Intuitively," he begins.
"Intuitively,waste-avoidance and preserving the benefits of contract-

4" Letter from John Keats to George and Tom Keats (Dec. 22, 1818), in 1 THE
LETTERS OFJOHN KEATS: 1814-1821, at 193 (Hyder Edward Rollins ed., 1958).

42 See Hillman, supra note 7, at 618-19 ("My second goal is to explain the common
approach to cessation.... Four interrelated fairness norms figure prominently in
such analysis.").
43 Id. at 626.
44 Id. at 640.
45 Id. at 640-41.
46 Id. at 641.

47 Id.
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ing through 'keeping the deal together' correspond with protecting
the substantial reliance interest of a party on harm-avoidance
48
grounds."
The Posnerian and Hillman standards are concerned with
different kinds of unexpected losses. The Posnerian standard
implements the allocation of estimated losses behind the veil of
history. It seeks to determine what the parties should have decided
about allocation before the unexpected event occurred. In contrast,
Hillman's standard is concerned with the distribution of actual
losses. There is no reason to believe the standards would yield the
same outcomes. To reconcile his standard with the Posnerian
version Hillman misstates the efficiency standard by linking it with
his goal of "keeping the deal together." The feminine virtue of
Hillman's article thereby ruptures in this passage: confronting the
threat of difference between his argument and another's, Hillman's
response exhibits the stereotypical weaknesses associated with
femininity: he appeals to intuition to cover a slight misrepresentation, using misrepresentation as it is commonly deployed to mitigate
the feminine terror of confrontation, argument, and autonomy.
Although the texts I have been discussing seek to provide a
useful legal standard by which to determine how impossibility
doctrine is applied, they therefore fail in their objectives. Just as
Hillman's legal argument fails when the gendered persona of his
text falters and is reasserted, so Posner and Rosenfield's attempt to
develop a legal standard for impossibility fails at a point of crisis in
the gender role of their text. By asserting that "doubtful cases"
should not be excused, they avoid discharge and call on the parties
for performance. Masculine cockiness thus identifies the point at
Which Posner and Rosenfield abruptly abandon the project of
delineating a legal standard for impossibility doctrine and arbitrarily
reinstate the principle of strict liability in its place.
C. The Gendered Context of Impossibility Doctrine
Thus far my analysis of current impossibility literature has used
reading strategies inspired by postmodern feminism in order to
expose shortcomings in current approaches to the problem of
impossibility. Let me now indicate briefly how feminist theory
might yield constructive insights regarding the generation of
persuasive doctrinal argument in impossibility cases.
48

Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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One idea is to explore the striking parallels between impossibility doctrine and the character and development of divorce and
Like impossibility doctrine, the function of
annulment law.
annulment and divorce is specifically to excuse performance of
49
obligations imposed by the contractual relations of the parties.
But the analogies between these fields have historically been
foreclosed to contract disputes because of the segregation of the
legal subject areas. Because of women's historical links to and
dependence on the domestic sphere, the segregation of these areas
has a decidedly sex-based character. This sex-segregated character
seems particularly pronounced in the context of the nineteenth
century, when impossibility doctrine was purportedly "formed."50
At that time the contracting activity of married women was largely
confined to their marriage contracts. Until the reforms begun in
the mid-nineteenth century by the Married Women's Property Acts,
the law relating to the contracts most women entered was separated
51
from the law of other contracts.
I think it would be useful for feminists to elaborate the
historically gendered roots of current impossibility doctrine, seeking
to determine the effect on impossibility doctrine of placing it in a
broader context.5 2 One could, for example, track the parallels of
the changing remedial consequences of divorce and impossibility
over time, seeking-with some caution-to determine the significance
of the historical separation between these two similar doctrinal
areas. Like impossibility doctrine of the same period, the law of
49 See 1 THEoPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 384 (1980) (impossibility

defense); 11 id. at 556 (marriage contracts).
5o Impossibility doctrine was purportedly "formed" in the early or mid-nineteenth
century. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 138 n.206 (1974) (crediting
Tarling v. Baxter, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (1827), as the early leading case); Leon E.
Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Slaringand CommercialImpracticability,69 MINN.
L. REV. 471, 475 (1985) (crediting Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863)).
Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1647), is conventionally cited as evidence that
impossibility doctrine did not exist earlier. See, e.g., KESSLER ET AL., supra note 12,
at 913. This case raises for me, however, the possibility that the doctrine in fact
predates the nineteenth century, since such a "rejection" could be understood as a
recognition of the doctrine coupled with a refusal to utilize it.
5 See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A FeministCritiqueof Rights Analysis, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 387, 399 n.56 (1984) ("Until the passage of the married women's property
acts in the late 19th century, married women were legally incompetent to bind
themselves by contract.").
52 The methodology of this section is consistent with the long-standing feminist
practice of analyzing the consequences for a particular discourse of omitting women
or topics which particularly interest or involve women.
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divorce in mid-nineteenth century American legal history offered
parties narrower opportunities for excuse of contract performance
than is true today. Unlike the consequences of impossibility
doctrine, however, the use of divorce did not always fully discharge
marital contracts, in that alimony awards functioned in many cases
to extend a husband's duties of marital support after divorce had
53
terminated his marital status.
In this century Ian Macneil and others have argued that contract
doctrine ought to take into account, rather than suppress, the
interest which contract parties may have in preserving their
relationship beyond the event giving .rise to an impossibility
dispute. 54 Indeed, Macneil is often cited by those, like Hillman
and Speidel, who seek to encourage a duty of adjustment in certain
impossibility situations. There is a remarkable similarity between
Macneil's description of "relational" contract law and its remedial
consequences and the typical descriptions of marriage and divorce
law which preceded the divorce reforms of the early 1970s. Despite
the warm reception that Macneil's proposals have received among
some contract scholars, there is a remarkable silence regarding his
work among others, including, not surprisingly, Posner and
Rosenfield.
Another potentially fruitful comparison between the law of
divorce and impossibility doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century is
likely to be the acknowledged interest of the state in divorce suits.
In the classical treatment of impossibility issues, the public interest
was so decisively banished from explicit consideration that courts
often heavily and unsubtly deployed the device of an invented
"implied condition" to determine whether excuse was warranted, a
device subjected to increasing criticism after the turn of the
century. 55 In contrast, a marriage and divorce treatise writer of
the mid-nineteenth century describes the public interest in divorce
litigation as the "one great controlling principle running through all
matrimonial suits, and bringing into subserviency all other law on
the subject." 56 Indeed, in at least two states a public prosecuting
53 See JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE,
AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS §§ 548-590 (Boston, Little, Brown 1852).

54 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
55

See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 668-669
(WalterJaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961) ("Where ... the law itself has imposed the condition
...it can ... shap[e] the boundaries of the constructive condition in such a way as
to do justice and avoid hardship.").
56 BISHOP, supra note 53, § 297.
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officer was required to participate in divorce proceedings along with
57
the parties.
Although the public interest in divorce continues to hover over
even the most liberal no-fault divorce jurisdictions, 58 the public
interest in such proceedings is considerably more subtly manifested
than it was in the last century; parties enjoy the appearance of more
individualized control over divorce. In contrast, the public interest
in impossibility disputes is more overt than it was in the last
century, in part because impossibility disputes seem to arise more
frequently today as a result of governmental regulatory changes than
seems to have been the case in the past. The task here will be to
analyze, again exercising caution, the significance of the changing
roles of public interest in the separated yet analogous areas
involving claims to excuse contract performance.
III. RESCUING (RE-SKEWING) IMPOSSIBILITY DOCTRINE

The gendered integrity that I have argued Posner/Rosenfield
and Hillman tenaciously preserve in their essays is incompatible
with the approach I attribute to postmodern feminists regarding
sexual difference. There is, in fact, an illuminating parallel between
the postmodern feminist desire to challenge the borders that define
us as men and women and a re-skewed, cogent impossibility
doctrine which is neither masculine, nor feminine, nor some
confused, androgynous mixture.
Although lesbian feminists and women of color have begun to
unravel the imperialistic claims many feminists make regarding
women, 59 postmodern feminists have theorized these challenges.
They maintain that replacing male values with female values simply
reallocates power between the poles of an axis; it does not
60 Malechallenge the confining structure of the (gendered) axis.
57 See id.

58 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1760 (West 1982) (providing that the family
conciliation court shall have jurisdiction over "any controversy... between spouses
[who have a minor child in their household whose welfare might be affected by the
controversy] ...

which may ...

result in the dissolution or annulment of the

marriage"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1A (Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1991)
(providing that in deciding on a couple's efforts to obtain divorce on the ground of
irretrievable breakdown of their marriage, "the court shall... make a finding as to
whether or not an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage exists").
59
See, e.g., THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF
COLOR (Cherrie Moragan & Gloria Anzaldfia eds., 1983) (challenging feminist claims
from the perspective of both lesbian feminists and women of color).
60 See generally GALLOP, SEDUCTION, supra note 11, at 124 (noting that female
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ness and femaleness therefore persevere as confining and restraining consequences of biological data because of the oppositional
framework in which we locate them.
Postmodern feminists seek to alter this oppositional structure by
grounding their analyses of sexual difference on the structuralist
insight that meaning depends on non-meaning. Maleness is notjust
the opposite of femaleness. Instead, maleness depends on femaleness.
Unlike Posner, Rosenfield, and Hillman, postmodern
feminists are willing to confront the differences within maleness or
femaleness. 61 At the same time, despite current claims to the
contrary,6 2 postmodern feminists also accept sexual difference.6 3
Postmodern feminists are thus able to treat women as historically
situated individuals with commonalities at the same time that they are
challenging the link between femininity and biological femaleness.
Transposing their paradoxical approach toward sexual difference
to impossibility doctrine, a postmodern feminists' observation would
be that the meaning of strict liability or performance depends on
the concept of what non-performance or excuse of performance
would mean. Contract law is constituted by the idea that parties can

count on allocating today the risks of tomorrow. By claiming that
some unexpected circumstances are not allocated by contract, the
doctrine of impossibility affirms the ability of contract to protect
against those risks that are allocated. Impossibility doctrine is thus
located at the margins of strict liability, where it constantly
threatens to disrupt expectations of performance-just as postmodern feminists both acknowledge and challenge the borders that
define us as men and women. Indeed it is because of this location
at the margins that impossibility doctrine can perform its constituting and liberating function within contract doctrine.
theorists merely reverse the bipolar gender characterization of male theorists);
KRi TEVA, READER, supra note 11, at 81-82 (discussing the Marxist view of wealth as
resulting from the bipolar elements of work, which is male, and matter, which is
female).
61 See e.g., IRIGARAY, THIS SEx, supra note 11, at 81-85 (discussing how "the
double
demand-for both equality and difference-[can] be articulated").
62
Postmodern feminists are increasingly charged with claims that their work is depolitical, or anti-political, or post-feminist. See, e.g., Karen Offen, The Use and Abuse
of Histoty, WOMEN'S REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 1989, at 15-16 (asking "Must the
postmodernistbe necessarily post-feminist?"). ButseeJOHNSON,A WORLD, supra note
11, 6at 25-31 (discussing whether "writerliness" is "conservative").
3Jane Gallop is particularly adept at challenging the male/female opposition at
the same time she disrupts it. See generally GALLOP, SEDUCTION, supra note 11.

1046

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 140:1029

In their efforts to subject the problem of unexpected contract
conditions to predictable standards, Posner, Rosenfield, and
Hillman segregate impossibility from strict liability. This instinct
toward segregation is understandable, in that oppositional relationships tend to produce hierarchies. And the value of impossibility
doctrine to contracting parties would be jeopardized if the doctrine
were subordinated to strict liability, just as the value of contracting
would be drastically undermined if the principle of strict liability
were subordinated to the doctrine of impossibility. As we have
seen, however, these authors' segregating efforts devolve into yet
another oppositional structure, the genderization of impossibility,
and this genderization defeats the project of articulating a predictable standard of impossibility doctrine application.
I think that the quest for a predictable standard is misguidedthat impossibility doctrine must be articulated in relationship to but
not in opposition to the principle of strict liability. This obligation
makes the doctrine of impossibility doctrine "impossible." But I do
not believe that claiming the impossibility of impossibility doctrine
requires the doctrine to be consigned to the realm of the subjective,
the irrational, the nihilistic, or the non-legal. My suggested feminist
approach to impossibility adopts the approach postmodern feminists
have used in confronting the problem of sexual difference.
Postmodern feminists do not seek to help women be more like men
"or to replace male values with female values, or to achieve an
androgynous reconstruction and unification of male and female.
Postmodern feminists attempt to overcome the male/female
opposition by accepting it and at the same time disrupting it.
Can feminist critical scholars claim a different voice in analyzing
contract law doctrine? I hope I have conveyed that we can, in so far
as the use. of gender stereotypes is useful in legal analysis. I also
hope I have indicated that we cannot.
"Who are we" is a penetrating question to turn on my discussion
here. The feminine text I analyzed was written by a man. The
stereotypes I associated with gender may not be every woman's or
every feminist's. The negative stereotypes associated with Hillman's
text distinguish his "voice" and mine from the upbeat version of
femininity popularly attributed to Gilligan's book. 64 Indeed, I am
willing to admit that the particular traits I associate with masculine
and feminine stereotypes are undoubtedly a product of my cultural

64 See GILLIGAN, supra note 27.
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